Abstract
did not do justice to the actual and concrete reality o f events or to the peculiar particularity o f individuals. To give expression to his concern Stoker proposed not only the cosmic dimension o f events, but also the category o f the 'idion,' the irreducible reality o f something creaturely 'in its own right', or, as he expressed it, its "eie-standigheid" . Stoker feared that D ooyew eerd's thought obliterated some dimensions o f creation with his pervasive and encompassing view o f crea tion's law side. He w anted to stress that all creatures have an inviolable, irre ducible right to a difference o f their own being.
D ooyeweerd maintained, however, that Stoker's concerns threatened to neglect the creature's total dependence on the law o f God, as well as that these concerns should not lead to philosophy's dealing with everything whatsoever. Philosophy has its limits. And some o f Stoker's concerns, real though they were, transcen ded the proper limits o f philosophy in D ooyew eerd's view.
I have always sympathised with both men. I agreed with D ooyew eerd that philo sophy has its limits and that Stoker seemed too eager not merely to do justice to all reality , but to do so philosophically. But 1 also heard in Stoker's objections an intuition that in D ooyew eerd's philosophy little space was left in the universe for the reality o f creation beyond its law side.
At that time it would have been impossible to articulate w hat today might be called a 'postm odern' intuition in Stoker: a respect for inclusivity and alterity that was absent in traditional philosophy. In D ooyew eerd such 'postm odern' intui tions were arguably present as well, though not in the area o f Stoker's concerns. D ooyew eerd's are found more in his analysis o f the autonomy o f reason. Stoker was out to include the individual in its own individuality. However, his concep tualization or thematization o f his 'inclusivity intuition' may have been partly to blame for a troubling inconsistency, which only now, given our postm odern as well as our approaching post-apartheid context, becom es clear to us. This incon sistency com es to the surface in his desire to include the different within the philosophical arena o f the same, which may have left him blind to apartheid as a reality o f exclusion. It is possible that the only inclusion o f the black other he could muster w as within a white intellectual system which in the reality o f practice oppressed and excluded that black other Possibly Stoker's intuitions about alterity remained so imprisoned within a conceptual system, in spite o f his intentions, that the real other, in his case the black other, escaped his full atten tion. Possibly, though Stoker's intuition about D ooyeweerd w as right, Dooye weerd w as also right to say that a more inclusive philosophy would not be the way to deal with the problem.
M ay room for an other, conceptually enclosed in a theoretical view, perhaps make it difficult to keep sight o f the actual other? Is it possible that justice for an other confined to a conceptual system results, not in a genuine plurality o f people, but rather in others reduced to otheme.vs, while real others are kept 'out' or apart? To honour Stoker in the centennial year o f D ooyew eerd's birth, I take up the issue they raised once again, though not by revisiting their discussion. Rather, I address the issue in its postmodern form. But I also treat it within the frame work o f the tradition in which Stoker and Dooyeweerd worked, namely that of reformational philosophy. I want to explore the limits o f philosophy in relation to our concern for alterity, by placing philosophy in relation to the philosophizing self. It will then appear that concern for an other which remains a philosophical concern, may be limited to a concern for an other who is self-same. A merely philosophical concern for alterity thus may keep a truly other self apart from the world o f same selves. On the other hand, a concern for an other which includes that other in my own world, may require an awareness o f that world beyond the limits o f philosophy, a being present in the world beyond the limits o f being as presence.
T he typical W estern Ego
W estern self-identity at its core has strong traditional connections with self as being, a self whose being is being rational. Examples are D escartes' cogito, K ant's transcendental-logical ego, and the popular self-definition o f 'm an' as ra tional animal. The note o f triumph in cogito ergo sum is the certainty o f being: 'Therefore I a m It is a triumph rooted in its being established rationally: cogito! ergo. So there! Self-assured reassurance o f being self. This W estern self, for all practical purposes as well as essentially, is a privileged white, heterosexual, and powerful male in whose own life as thinking subject other human functions such as trust, feeling, sensation, emotion, being body, and others are thought less of. A self who 'de-fines' him self as rational self, sur rounds him self by or encloses himself within rational boundaries: the fin e s ' with in which he is self. That excludes these other functions from his proper self, even if he cannot deny they are his. Further, this rational self, in a manner o f speaking, also 'excludes' or sees as outside the rational enclosure within which he is being himself, 'other' selves who are not same selves. That is, he excommunicates from proper humanity, to one degree or other, women, poets and painters as truthmakers, homosexuals, Jews, the poor, people o f colour, and others (Lloyd 1984; Nye, 1990) .
The rational self, reason, also sees whatever is other than the sameness in whose guise all things appear to this self, as outside o f the enclosure o f proper being. So he depreciates difference, transcendence, subjectivity, individuality, spiri tuality, feeling, and more. The real world o f this rational-world-making-self is thus a reduced world. Like the self that /?roject-ed it and thus oA-ject-ified it, it is a world o f being, whose being is its being immutably rational, cast in the mould o f reason by being held out before it in a fixed gaze, then cast out. Rational being is true, essential, real being. The rest o f what there is, is a reality manqué, is-not, has no being, is called mê on by Parmenides. His stage-setting demar cation o f thinking, being, and sameness still has most o f philosophy in its grip. Postmodern divided selves may be divided precisely because o f their reluctance to really let go totally o f the totalizing grip o f rational sameness.
Initial observations about p hilosop hy's role in the w orld o f reason
To put his life 'in order' the rational self, also known as reason, autonomously develops a rational tradition known as philosophy: the story o f the thinking self who in philosophy orders or structures being in its immutable universality, to tality, and self-identity; being as present to thought. The word o f philosophy, in this tradition, is a first and last word. Philosophy, or reason in philosophy, makes Bruggemann-Kruyff, 1993 There is an intuitive aw areness that rational philosophy is, on the one hand, con stitutionally incapable o f real totality, while on the other hand it seems as though the totality o f being remains within reason's control. So if our life is to be put in order philosophically, both theoretically and practically, by a tradition o f reason which itself is limited and is not the limit o f the real, then what if reason forgets those limits? Then subjectivity, individuality, and difference will not be able to find a place o f honour within the tradition, will be marginalized. The order o f a life thus put in order will be reduced to an order o f sameness, a sam eness con centrated in a desire for power and control.
In our very day w e see a continuation o f this straggle in the work o f people who have been impressed with the postm odern and feminist critique o f reason, but who struggle with taking their leave o f an essentially rational self which hangs on to an autonomous last word. Their solution seems to be the traditional one: build ing more o f what has to remain outside o f reason into reason itself. Then philo sophy can continue to excercise its power, but more inclusively. I raise the ques tion, however, whether we can expect any real healing from a rational philosophy tradition whose marginalization is unavoidable by the very fact o f its being rational. To put the matter somewhat differently: the accusation o f a neglectful rational philosophy is to the point if philosophy makes legitimate claims to dealing with totality, universality, or the encompassing. But if those claims are legitimately contested, if rational philosophy should not be perceived as competent to deal comprehensively with genuine totality, then we are in more difficult waters.
Initial exploration o f an approach
An approach to reason and philosophy in continuity with the above might be to see them as useful in a limited way, prompting the question: what might be the proper limits? Knowing such limits could help us assess a philosophical response to marginalization which would expect philosophy to be more inclusive. A move tow ard greater inclusion might, for example, appear to be more 'politically' correct. But if it would require rational philosophy to move beyond its own rational limits, the question remains: are we helped by taking steps loo big for our boots?
To make space for 'others' not now included in fullbloodcd rational being, we might, instead o f doing something philosophical in which rational philosophy goes beyond the bounds o f reason, consider that there's life beyond philosophy. (D ooye weerd, 1953-1958) . A Critique, moreover, which is appropriately initiated by an inquiry into the self which in philosophy is trying to be self-critical.
If w e stay with this for a moment we may entertain the idea that there is no need at this point to simply reject reason and philosophy. 
R ational philosophy
I will now try to develop a fuller picture o f what might fairly be called rational philosophy, a body o f claims formed within the logical space o f reasons. Within that space our basic elements are concepts. They are elements within a larger whole, a theoretical model, o f which they are parts. Concepts o f rational theory are mostly attempts at grasping, explicating, and bringing to the surface shared structures, developed primarily as instruments o f control. Concepts are structural moments o f reality, formed by using control as a cognitive model (LakofT, 1987) . They are often successful, beneficial, helpful instruments o f control. That is a lot. But it is not all there is to reality. Within our controlled conceptual grasp we know but a side o f things.
In this context w e can see the task o f rational philosophy as the construction o f an idealized model or framework for all special disciplinary conceptual models, a model that will allow us to bring coherence into our theoretical-conceptual world, as well as to conceptualize the relation o f our theories to the greater body o f con cepts in everyday life. To use Quinean language: philosophy in this account or ganises the w eb o f scientific beliefs and relates it to wider webs.
The idea that reality is itself given as structured the w ay philosophy sees it and has that structure for all times, combined with the idea that philosophy is our authority on truth w hereby we order our lives, allowed the W est to see philo sophy as giving us w hat Rorty has called a 'permanent neutral fram ew ork' o f truth. This framework gave reason in philosophy the illusion o f being cultural overseer. However, work done in this context by Rorty and others has made a strong case for concepts neither being given nor forever. We m ake them and change them and they are not inclusive. The latter especially is one o f the rich re wards o f George LakofFs empirical linguistic research (Lakoff, 1987) .
Nevertheless, conceptual frameworks are or can be objective and can or do work for us reliably. Although they are 'm ade and not found,' they are at the same time not 'm ade up'. Good categories and concepts require careful analysis and solid empirical evidence. O bjective concepts, though rationally and thus limitedly conceived by rational and thus limited people, are not a form o f arbitrary inter ference in reality, partly because o f reality's resistance to such interference, partly because o f respect shown to reality by concept makers.
1 hings in this world are 'there' independently from us. Conceptualizing them or categorizing them in earnest is real and important work. Though many things may not in principle be immune to distortive interference, we also are under se vere constraints to avoid such distortion. If we have a concept o f sweets that allows us to eat them carelessly, our teeth or our girth will inform us o f our care lessness. That is: reality is 'corrective' o f subjective distortion, even though the ozone layer tells us that sometimes we can go very long without seeing that we are distorting. The 'other' that is beyond the sameness o f our conceived order in its very otherness has its own ways o f preserving 'objectivity'. But that objec tivity can then not, o f course, be one o f being 'cast out there', or objectified out side o f us by reason. Rather, 'objective' will then need to characterize a rela tionship o f mutuality in which the other is respected as other, and thus as an other whose reality transcends its conceptualization.
Conceptual frameworks largely help us order, structure, or make sense o f our experience, our world. When scientifically developed, they also allow us to in crease our control in the good sense o f the word. And to repeat: other and dif ferent are not even completely beyond the sameness o f conception, though they are conceptualized only as other/ie.v.v, the other and the different, that is, as sanies. Though that is reductive, it need not be wrong, so long as we do not con sider conceptualization as being comprehensive and remember that to do other kinds o f justice to reality we must sing, trust, paint, make love. The limits of philosophy or reason thus conceived cannot be overcome philosophically or ra tionally. They can at best be observed that way, and then only from a position inside the limits.
On this conception o f reason as human rationality, reason brings us within the logical space o f reasons and for anything to be rational is for it to go through the appropriate channels within that space. And for a philosophy to lay claim to being a rational philosophy, it would on this conception have to be the philosophy which even Rorty recommends, a look in general at things in general within the space o f reasons. This kind o f philosophy, that is, this construction o f a wide theoretical framework which would be a home for our more partial theoretical frameworks such as those o f physics, or biology, or sociology, or ethics, would be very useful and would contribute considerably to our ability to order our lives. As the confession o f w hat a tradition ultimately trusts, it makes sense even to a reason-trusting rational self.
Reason that disqualifies trust hides the fact that such dis-trust is m ade possible on the basis o f trust-in-reason. Trust in reason thus masks the trust it takes to deny our need for trust to know the truth. But in searching for the guidance w e need in the big issues o f human life: who we are, what w e will become, what our origin and destiny are, the eschatological issues, we cannot depend on an isolated and autonomous reason, because the distance we are aw ay from the realities we con template in these issues makes rational conceptualization inadequate at best.
Here we are lost unless we tm st the stories o f trust, the myths that human com munities have told us about their journeys through history. Such stories are not rational theories. They take the form o f myths, poems, or songs because in these forms we can express what in the logical space o f reasons becom es incoherent. In a tradition in which reason has the last word, every story o f ultimacy, precisely because it is a story and not a theory, will be seen as containing strong rational incoherencies. This is amply dem onstrated today by many who have trusted the story of reason, have duly noted that if turned on itself it reveals self-referential incoherencies, and continue to expect the last word on this issue from reason.
Kai N ielsen's repeated claim, in virtually all o f his many writings in philosophy o f religion, that the concept o f God in developed Judaism, Islam, or Christianity is (logically) incoherent is a fair claim. But it is not a fair accusation which puts its finger on something wrong. The word 'G od', though requiring concepts for its meaning, docs not simply refer to a single, coherent, rational-logical concept.
Trust that reaches out to our intimations o f reality at the limits o f our experience allows itself to be expressed, but not to be abstractly and exclusively argued about logically. R eason's rejection o f trust as a poor substitute for rational com mon sense is itself such an incoherent reality o f the world o f trust. For that re jection hides from the light o f reason a covert call fo r trust in reason, which will never be revealed in the light o f reason precisely because reason, while trusted, hides this from itself. In ultimately trusting reason as the last word, the rational self dem ands so-called rational pronouncements on realities far beyond its reach.
Reason may in such a situation in one and the same move deny the possibility that there are omnipotent beings and covertly act out in pseudo-omnipotence.
In a recent work Nielsen (1993:24) acknowledges that reason as a "necessary step on the historical road to universal enlightenment and human self-perfection" is a religious myth. And he rejects it. But he also insists that when truth is our overriding concern, reason should break ties with concerns that conflict with it (Nielsen, 1993:12) . Does reason provide the only ultimate clearing for things to come to light truly? Perhaps not entirely, for even more recently he has sugges ted a positive role for religion in the realm o f what he calls "the existential func tions o f religion . . . " (Nielsen, 1994:22) . These, for Nielsen, pose questions that "standing where we stand now in cultural history, no thoughtful and informed person should think she has a good answer to" (Nielsen, 1994:35) . And in that context he speaks about (rational) truth as possibly "outweighed by other con siderations" (Nielsen, 1994:37) .
Focus on trust
W hat is this trust I have mentioned? It is a channel o f revelation o f ultimate mystery. Life is full o f mystery. It may take some courage for a rational self to admit this. But much o f reality is covered over with a veil that is beyond rational penetration. That is mystery. Some o f it can be revealed. Revealing is itself nothing unusual. For example, when we discover officials did not quite know how well prepared the subway trains were for a cold snap, they may excuse themselves by saying 'Only actual winter conditions will fully reveal the con dition o f our m achines'. That is all there is to 'revealing'. Something that was in the dark came to light.
Knowing other-wise: a discussion o f aherity and the limits o f philosophy
Trust (living-in-trust) reveals w hatever truth is available o f life's boundary mys teries: origin, destiny, salvation, suffering, evil, and so on. This requires trusting our lives with the narratives o f a tradition. In these narratives the accumulated trust o f certain intimations o f life's mystery is deposited as guide for life. They clear a space in which light falls on some o f the things otherwise veiled in m ys tery. In trust some o f the covering comes off. M ystery is revealed in the vul nerable action space o f trust, just as structure is conceptualized in the logical space o f reasons. Truth o f revealed mystery is aletheia: trust in w hat shows up in a clearing o f vulnerability. 'Resurrection' may be a w ord inspiring us with hope as w e live toward the boundary. A rational or scientific theory o f 'resurrection' is nonsense. So is a concept o f resurrection logically accessible to reason. But living a life oriented to trusting a resurrection narrative will reveal something, either truth or a lie.
For example, in capitalism the truth is for sale and the poor pay the price. In socialism the truth is belaboured till nobody can afford anything anymore. In both worlds the truth is revealed economically in the market. Only a life lived in trust can put such a trust to shame. Our W estern life o f trast in rational autonomy reveals to many that this trust is problematic. This trust is blind to itself being tmst in rational authority. It seeks to defend itself against the accusations o f marginalization by countercharging that a world not governed by reason is arbitrary and relativistic, individualistic and subjectivistic. It is intole rant to truth o f trust, to truth o f art, or o f love, or o f justice.
I hope this brief focus on trust has revealed that reason in the W est, far from having been encompassing and comprehensive, has had its deeper roots in trust and has encom passed itself with self-trust. I think this also reveals that trust goes deeper and reaches farther than reason ever can or will. But it does not mean that we can reject reason. It does not even mean that w e cannot trust reason ever or at all.
B ack to reason and philosophy
If the line o f argument developed so far has merit, our approach to problems o f rational autonomy could be one o f limiting reason to doing what it can and should do: w ork within its own limits. This approach would not make reason or philo sophy more inclusive, but would relativise it. And it would also relativise the order o f reason, especially the order uncovered in the wake o f search for control.
Philosophy would be no more than the internal integration o f the theoretical enterprise.
What about the other, the marginalized, the different? W e w ho are more than ra tional as the selves that w e are, w e as living agents know as we reason that there is much more reality beyond reason; reality w e as agents love, care for, sing about, tm st, and many other things. The self as agent, even in being rational, is aw are o f transcendence, mystery, and the other, though not rationally so. 1 know more than I think. I also know at other times, for example when I love, trust, appreciate, feel, grow, care, sing, listen. All o f these have their limits, as does ra tional understanding. We cannot see everything, yet know more than we see. We also cannot understand everything, yet know more than we understand. As agents w e do all o f these. And we can allow our reason to be open to other sides o f our agency, including our ultimate trust.
Philosophy is a legitimate conceptual strategy for conceptual integration o f our conceptual frameworks, theories, worldviews. It brings conceptual comprehen sion, coherence and integration to partial concepts and conceptual configurations. 
C onclusion
If indeed the rise o f philosophy in ancient Greece was from the beginning con nected with the replacement o f the tradition o f religious faith (in which faith was known as a life o f trust and not -though beliefs were an aspect o f faith -a cognitive body o f beliefs), then it is understandable that the rational-noetic view, picture, image, copy o f reality had the religious function o f capturing the truth about reality construed as a God's-eye-view . N ow that after two millennia we are questioning this development because o f its distorting and oppressive conse quences, two major approaches emerge as possibilities o f dealing with this W es tern inheritance. One would be to acknowledge the limited, relative, and legi timate merits o f a very broad conceptual framework to help integrate more partial conceptual frameworks and thereby contribute to elements o f coherent ordering and wholesome control which are a necessary dimension o f human culture. This toned down version o f rational philosophy would then not give us privileged access to truth, would not be the privileged source o f an immutable and essential order which encompassingly encloses all o f reality, and could not be made more serviceable by assigning it tasks which transcend the limits o f reason but whose outcomes are nevertheless presented as rational. In this approach reason and philosophy need to acknowledge faith, religion, and spirituality as normal and le gitimate dimensions o f human existence, different from, but not com petitors of reason, contributing to human experience in their own way.
The other approach would be to continue to regard reason and philosophy as the last word on truth, as supreme guide in life and culture, as our most reliable orien tation in issues o f origin and destiny. But then this should be acknow ledged as religious trust in reason and philosophy, where there is no rational justification for granting this place to reason, but only hope. This is the religion o f reason, Jas pers' philosophical faith, which can demand no superiority to other religions except on the only ground w e have to decide issues o f ultimacy, namely whether the life o f trust in reason delivers human happiness and wellbeing, leads to a flou rishing o f human culture, saves us from oppression, distortion, and suffering more than a life o f faith in God. Choice here is, largely, a matter o f trust.
P ostscript
I began this piece with a preface and must end it with a postscript. My explo rations between preface and postscript w ere occasioned by reflections on a theme discussed by Stoker and Dooyew eerd and were intended to honour Stoker. But the explorations have revealed something I already referred to in the preface: if you limit your concern for the other to a philosophical concern for otheme.w, you run the risk o f doing injustice to the other. And Stoker's philosophy, in spite o f his concern for the other, lent comfort to the architects o f apartheid. Not sur prisingly, for apartheid may with some justification be called an intellectual construct whose builders were unaware o f the pain caused by the concepts they so admired. It worked only within the brain, never in the land. So how do I ho nour a philosopher whose philosophy is linked to that pain'> I laving written the paper I wrote, this question is unavoidable. If the voice o f the other cannot be heard as other in philosophy, philosophy and the other are doomed.
And in this volume o f intellectuals honouring an intellectual, the 'others' in this context must be allowed to be present. I owe them a response as to why 1 honour Stoker, when 1 dem onstrate in my piece that his thought kept them apart from a system which aimed to include them.
And this is where I hope the postscript connccts with the preface. Stoker's con cern with alterity as a philosophical concern contributed to injustice. But I trust that the concern originated in 'the other Stoker'. This genuinely pious, humble, open child o f the O ther and friend o f others was undoubtedly inspired in his philosophical concern for alterity by his deep respect for the limits o f reason. It put him in touch with all that transcends reason, above all with the Transcendent. In his philosophical concern, if we regard it as a 'postm odern' intuition that did not fully blossom, we may see how Stoker heard the Other pass by (as Levinas might put it) or how he preserved a trace o f the oilier (as Derrida might put it).
Being an intellectual is a dangerous business, 
